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ABSTRACT
SWIMMING IN A SEA OF SHAME:
INCORPORATING EMOTION INTO EXPLANATIONS OF INSTITUTIONAL
REPRODUCTION AND CHANGE

We theorize the role in institutional processes of what we call the shame nexus, a set of shamerelated constructs: felt shame, systemic shame, sense of shame, and episodic shaming. As a
discrete emotion, felt shame signals to a person that a social bond is at risk and catalyzes a
fundamental motivation to preserve valued bonds. We conceptualize systemic shame as a form of
disciplinary power, animated by persons’ sense of shame, a mechanism of ongoing
intersubjective surveillance and self-regulation. We theorize how the duo of the sense of shame
and systemic shame drives the self-regulation that underpins persons’ conformity to institutional
prescriptions and institutional reproduction. We conceptualize episodic shaming as a form of
juridical power used by institutional guardians to elicit renewed conformity and reassert
institutional prescriptions. We also explain how episodic shaming may have unintended effects,
including institutional disruption and recreation, when it triggers sensemaking among targets and
observers that can lead to the reassessment of the appropriateness of institutional prescriptions or
the value of social bonds. We link the shame nexus to three broad categories of institutional
work.
Key Words: Institutional Theory, Emotion, Shame, Institutional Microfoundations, Inhabited
Institutions, Institutional Work, Power, Institutional Reproduction, Institutional Change,
Conformity.
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As institutional theory has emerged as a dominant perspective in organizational studies
(Greenwood, Oliver, Suddaby, & Sahlin, 2008), critics argue it has also become disconnected
from its phenomenological roots in social interaction (Hallett & Ventresca, 2006). Calls for
exploring the microfoundations of institutions (Powell & Colyvas, 2008) point to the need to
better understand how people make sense of themselves relative to their contexts, how passions
and interests are implicated in institutional enactments, and how daily enactments and practices
can transform institutional arrangements. Such calls notwithstanding, there remains the risk that
“passing references to micro sociology” are little more than ceremonial invocations and handwaving and that too little attention is actually paid to the role of persons: “Contemporary
institutionalism finds itself grappling with the important question: What are we to do about
people” (Hallett & Venstresca, 2006:214, 230).
In this paper, we offer one response to this question by focusing on the role of emotions
in institutional processes. We present an argument that contributes to institutional theory by
complementing and extending the emerging inhabited institutions and institutional work
perspectives, which aspire to reinvigorate institutionalism’s phenomenological roots by
populating institutional processes with emotional and socially embedded people. We focus on a
single emotion, shame, using it to deepen our understanding of institutional inhabitants’ social
relations and participation in institutional processes. In our analysis, we begin with a definition
of felt shame as a persons’ experience of negative self evaluations based on anticipated or actual
depreciation by others due to a failure to meet standards of behavior (Tracy & Robins, 2004;
Turner & Stets, 2005). We then integrate the individual level construct of felt shame with other
analytical constructs in what we refer to as the shame nexus. These additional constructs include:
a person’s sense of shame, an internal mechanism of intersubjective surveillance and self3

regulation; systemic shame, an intersubjective form of disciplinary power comprising shared
understandings of the conditions that give rise to felt shame; and episodic shaming, a form of
juridical power aimed at preventing or extinguishing transgressive enactments by inducing felt
shame. As these interrelated constructs suggest, the shame nexus operates across levels of
analysis, from the macro level systems of meaning that underpin prescriptions of what
constitutes shameful behavior to the micro level internalization of those prescriptions in ways
that animate persons’ intersubjective surveillance and self-regulation. Below, we elaborate on the
elements of the shame nexus and explain how its components animate processes of institutional
reproduction and change.
We contribute to the literature in several ways. First, in theorizing the shame nexus we
present a unique, multilevel, interdisciplinary integration of constructs related to the operation of
shame. Through our theorizing of the shame nexus we show an important way in which
emotional bonds shape persons’ commitments to institutional prescriptions. More importantly,
we show how, under different circumstances, the lived experience of the shame nexus plays a
central role in shaping institutional inhabitants’ motivations to engage in the work of institutional
maintenance, disruption, or creation (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006). Based on our arguments, we
call both for further empirical exploration of the role of the shame nexus in the intertwined
processes of institutionalization and subjectification and for the examination of the role of other
social emotions – emotions that pertain to the state of the social relations (Sayer, 2005) that hold
communities together – in institutional processes.
Below we begin by briefly framing the theoretical context and underlying assumptions
we rely on in our analysis. We then highlight the ways in which the omission of emotions from
dominant cognitive perspectives limits our understanding of how persons participate in

4

institutional processes. Having established our background assumptions, we then present our
theory in two steps. First, we argue for the particular relevance of felt shame to institutional
processes by invoking notions of social bonds, disciplinary power, and subjectification. Because
persons’ ongoing anticipation and avoidance of felt shame are key mechanisms in preserving
valued social bonds (Scheff, 2000, 2005), we argue that such self-regulation (Baumeister, Vohs,
DeWall, & Zhang, 2007; Sheikh & Janoff-Bulman, 2010) is the mechanism that animates
systemic shame as a form of disciplinary power. We then theorize the particular role of episodic
shaming as a related exercise of power, deployed to reassert and strengthen institutional norms
and suppress transgressive behavior. We argue that while episodic shaming is primarily deployed
to ensure conformity to institutional prescriptions, thereby contributing to institutional
reproduction, it can have the opposite effect in cases when the sensemaking it triggers leads to
rejection of institutional prescriptions or to the reconsideration of the value of social bonds. We
also discuss specific ways that the lived experience of the shame nexus can motivate different
types of institutional work. We close with a discussion of the implications of our analysis.
THEORETICAL CONTEXT
In institutional theory, the social structures and systems of meaning that shape persons’
choices and actions have phenomenological roots; social interactions give rise to shared
understandings of reality (Berger & Luckmann, 1967). That is, through social interactions, a
process referred to as “reciprocal typification” renders elements of social life into “types” and
categories of meaning (Berger & Luckmann, 1967). The product is shared meanings that take on
the objective qualities of exteriority and facticity. These seemingly objective, shared meanings
channel individual and collective action by making particular behavioral choices meaningful and
desirable (Friedland, 2002; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). These actions, in turn, provide opportunities
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for the retention and accumulation of human experiences and constructed meanings that are
“sedimented” in a common stock of knowledge (Berger & Luckmann, 1967; Friedland, 2002;
Weber & Glynn, 2006). Consequently, institutional theory has long emphasized the importance
of the practical rationality seen in the premises, rule-following, and cultural routines
characteristic of institutional processes. Thus, much of the literature on institutional processes
has been concerned with the ways practices and meanings are encoded, enacted, replicated or
revised, and made objective (Barley & Tolbert, 1997) and has emphasized the constitutive and
constraining nature of cognitions that reflect shared understandings about the way things are
done and what they signify (Zilber, 2002). In this view, institutional maintenance and
reproduction come full circle when individuals engage in rule following and enactments, guided
in their habituated behavioral routines purely by tacit or explicit mental schema that have
encoded institutional expectations into the meaningful scripts that shape future enactments
(Barley & Tolbert, 1997; Berger & Luckmann, 1967; Hallett & Ventresca, 2006).
Several scholars critique this emphasis on rule-following and the cognitive constraints on
action as overly structural (Bowring, 2000; Hallett & Ventresca, 2006), arguing that institutional
theory has become decoupled from its symbolic interactionist and phenomenological
underpinnings (Hallett & Ventresca, 2006). Such an emphasis is said to depict the people who
inhabit institutions as “cultural dopes” (Garfinkel, 1967), as it deemphasizes the social skills
persons use in the course of their daily lives as they participate in the intersubjective processes
that build, maintain, defend, challenge, or change institutions (Hirsch & Lounsbury, 1997;
Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Lawrence, Suddaby, & Leca, 2009). Consequently, many scholars
have called for more research on the important microfoundations and embodied practices that
underlie institutions (Barley, 2008; Bechky, 2011; Powell & Colyvas, 2008). Two perspectives
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that have emerged to shed light on these microfoundations – the inhabited institutions and
institutional work perspectives – call for a greater attention to social interaction and the
purposeful actions of the persons who inhabit institutional processes. In the next section we
explain how they provide the essential assumptions underlying our analysis.
Inhabited Institutions and Institutional Work
At the center of the inhabited institutions perspective is the call to give greater
consideration to the social, symbolic, and interactive nature of the action that underpins the
social construction of institutional arrangements. Hallett and Ventresca (2006) set out the
theoretical and empirical agenda for the inhabited institutions perspective by demonstrating how
employing a symbolic interactionist lens provides a way for institutional theory to bring persons,
their interactions, and their meaning making more fully into depictions of institutional processes.
Their analysis relies on Blumer’s three core precepts of social interactionism: “human beings act
towards things based on the meanings that the things have for them; the meaning of such things
is derived from, or arises out of, the social interactions that one has with one’s fellows; these
meanings are handled in, and modified through, an interpretative process used by the person in
dealing with the things he [or she] encounters” (Blumer, 1969:2).
In their rereading of Gouldner’s Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy (1954), Hallett and
Ventresca (2006) focus on interactions among actors, thereby shifting attention from what
persons do (enact prescriptions), to what they do together (negotiate practices and their meanings
as they concretize institutionalized forms of behavior). For us, one particularly noteworthy aspect
of their analysis is its attention to how institutional arrangements are rooted not solely in shared
cognitions, but rather also in the social “connective tissue” (2006:224) of kinship relations and
shared histories of accommodation, indulgence, loyalty, and the “magic words of condolence and
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congratulation.”
With its focus on how social interaction and shared interpretation “suffuse institutions”
with locally negotiated meanings and power, the inhabited institutions perspective has, according
to Bechky (2011:1158), the potential to uncover “fundamental mechanisms” that link the micro
with the macro and to respond to the “paradox of embeddedness.” We argue that for this
potential to be realized, scholars need to wrestle with the implications of the evocative images of
emotional connections – kinship, loyalty, condolence, and praise (Hallett & Ventresca,
2006:226). The great strength of the inhabited institutions perspective is that it accounts for the
ways meanings and enactments are doubly embedded, for example, in macro logics and in the
social interactions that give “contour” to those logics, establish local meanings, and shape action.
As Bechky (2011) reminds organizational theorists, people do not directly respond to social
structures, but rather to their local situations and their interpretations of them. So an underlying
assumption we take from this perspective is that the contours of meaning that provide the bases
for human action emerge through interactions which are embedded in the social “connective
tissue” of various types of emotional bonds.
Another perspective that seeks to redress the dominance of structural arguments in
institutional theory is that of institutional work (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Rojas, 2010;
Zietsma & Lawrence, 2010). The institutional work literature seeks to focus attention on “the
purposive actions of individuals and organizations aimed at creating, maintaining, and disrupting
institutions” (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006:216). Built on the works of DiMaggio (1988) and
Oliver (1991, 1992) as well as the sociology of practice (Bourdieu, 1972/1977; Wayne, 2009),
this perspective argues that institutions are perhaps not as self-perpetuating as some earlier
characterizations of institutional theory suggest and that individual and collective action is

8

required for sustained reproduction. To bring “individuals back into institutional theory,” they
argue, institutional theory needs to examine the self-awareness, skill, and reflexivity of actors
(Lawrence, Suddaby, & Leca, 2011:53). Lawrence and Suddaby (2006) critique, in particular,
the overly cognitive view that dominates institutional theory and advocate for the recognition
and analysis of emotion in research on institutional work. While they have spawned a stream of
subsequent work, few studies have picked up on their call for institutional explanations that go
beyond the common invoking of cognition to a more full attention to emotions and the “interplay
of emotional impact (pathos) and logical content (logos)” (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006:239).
(For exceptions see: Creed, DeJordy, & Lok, 2010; Lok & De Rond, 2013; Voronov & Vince,
2012). Some critical scholars suggest that this failure may stem from the fact that it is human
beings, not individuals or actors, who need to be brought back into institutional theory (Cooper,
Ezzamel, & Willmott, 2008). The point in distinguishing human beings from individuals is that
the concept of the individual is itself a sociocultural formulation – an institutional construct
vested with rationality and powers of creation – that should not taken for granted (Willmott,
2011). Following Voronov and Vince (2012) and Willmott (2011), we adopt an underlying
assumption that to better understand the microfoundations that underlie institutions we need to
replace the concept of the individual – with its connotations of atomized autonomy – with the
construct of the person. We do so in order to keep our focus on the socially-embedded,
interdependent, relational, and emotional nature of persons’ lived experiences of institutional
arrangements. Following advocates for the renewed consideration of emotion in sociological
analysis, we argue that emotions should be viewed “as the crucial link between micro and macro
levels of social reality” (Turner & Stets, 2005:1). Our goal then is to theorize emotional persons
who act on the basis of meanings arising from social interactions that are doubly embedded in
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institutions and systems of emotional bonds.
Incorporating Emotion
Consideration of emotion in organizational and social processes has gained importance
outside institutional theory, where theoretical and empirical work offers several useful points for
anchoring our exploration of emotional persons. Fundamentally, emotions are understood to
have objects (e.g., Elfenbein, 2007); these physiological reactions are always directed at
something in particular. Thus, emotions are somatic and semantic (Prinz, 2004); they entail
bodily sensations as well as appraisals of some person, event, object, or situation. As such,
emotions are meaningfully connected with things in the world (Barrett, Mesquita, Ochsner, &
Gross, 2007), including ourselves and others (Elfenbein, 2007). Importantly, emotions are what
make us human beings, distinguishing us both from machines, which can be designed for
impersonal calculation, and from stylized notions of rational actors, whose theoretical
instrumentality shows a machine-like penchant for it. To experience emotion is to live in the
world.
Emotions that connect people, that help social bonds develop and endure (Tracy &
Robins, 2004), are of particular interest in our exploration of institutions. These “social
emotions” emerge as reactions to our perceptions of our social standing and that of others
relative to norms and standards within social structures (Haidt, 2003; Leary, 2000; Tangney,
Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007; Tracy & Robins, 2004). Social emotions take many forms. For
instance, negatively valenced “other-directed” social emotions like contempt, anger, and disgust
are responses to others’ violations of the social order (e.g., Hutcherson & Gross, 2011; Rozin,
Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 1999), while “self-directed” social emotions including guilt,
embarrassment, and shame are responses to understanding that it is oneself who has violated the
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social order (Rozin et al., 1999; Tangney et al., 2007; Tracy & Robins, 2004). In effect, both
other- and self-directed social emotions provide people with feedback on their own and others’
standing as persons within a social group. To the degree that institutions rely on
microfoundations that entail symbolic interaction, social emotions are likely to be particularly
important in institutional processes. This is because social emotions are implicated in the ways
people make sense of and participate in the interactions that underpin the shared enactment of
institutional arrangements.
Emotions must have implications for the sensemaking which informs person’s
participation in institutional processes because they are indicators of what is salient to persons
and what motivates their actions (de Sousa, 1987; Voronov & Vince, 2012). For example, Weber
and Glynn (2006) have theorized how institutions prime cognition and trigger sensemaking,
arguing that institutions provide perceptual filters that enable people to extract cues from the
stream of phenomena they encounter. Emotions arguably belong squarely in their depiction of
embedded sensemaking because it is emotions that can both trigger sensemaking (Warren &
Smith-Crowe, 2008) and alert people to which of the myriad potential social cues are important
or deserve attention (Baumeister et al., 2007). In addition, Voronov and Vince (2012) recently
argued that a cognition-centered view alone cannot explain when or why persons will act to
maintain a given institutional order; emotion is necessary to understand dissatisfaction and any
motivation to engage in institutional change. For institutional researchers, the incorporation of
emotion enables rounding out explanations of “cognitive and volitional performances” by
attending to the mind’s “longings, its pleasures and pains” (James, 1884:188).
To be sure, people are not exclusively emotional any more than they are exclusively
cognitive and institutional theory should refuse to mischaracterize people as merely either, rather
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than both. Most fundamentally, we argue that a more accurate characterization of people would
push scholars to theorize more deeply the implications of calling institutional processes
“inhabited” (Scully & Creed, 1997). To better realize the theoretical potential of the inhabited
institutions (Hallett & Ventresca, 2006) and the institutional work perspectives (Lawrence &
Suddaby, 2006) we need to embrace “a more integrated human being whose passions and desires
are not reducible to the pursuit of rational interests” (Voronov & Vince, 2012:59). This allows us
to better attend to the embodied enactments that are the micro-foundations of institutions.
There are three reasons why, in our effort to incorporate emotion into the microfoundations of institutional processes, we focus on a single emotion, shame. The first pertains to
specificity. Scheff (2000) argues that discussing emotions in general relies on rarified
abstractions; in contrast, we are better able to understand specific felt emotions – shame, guilt,
embarrassment, disgust, pride – because we are more able to identify differences in their origins,
objects, appearances, and trajectories. Second, other scholars have suggested that shame, as it is
commonly understood, is likely to figure importantly in institutional reproduction and
maintenance by providing “powerful inducements to compliance with prevailing norms” (Scott,
2007). While shame, like other similar social emotions (i.e., guilt and embarrassment), can
motivate compliance (Nasaw & Saranow, 2002; Sullivan, 1996; Toneguzzi, 2002), felt shame is
distinct in that is also associated with forms of non-compliance, including withdrawal (Sheikh &
Janoff-Bulman, 2010; Tangney et al., 2007) or aggression (Tangney, Wagner, Fletcher, &
Gramzow, 1992). This means that shame may be linked to either institutional reproduction or
disruption. Third, shame, in its intersubjective disciplinary form, which we call systemic shame,
plays a key role in self-monitoring, sensemaking, self-regulation, and the construction of the self
(Scheff, 2000). However, in light of its multifaceted and multidisciplinary nature, a focus on
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shame as a specific emotion requires of us that we move beyond narrow discipline-bound
understandings of shame to make explicit the meaningful connections between the micro and
macro levels of analysis – for example, between self-regulation and institutionalization. We do
this through the development of the shame nexus, which is detailed in Table 1 and elaborated in
the next sections. The different constructs of the shame nexus reflect the complexity of shame as
it operates at different levels within institutions.
___________________________
Insert Table 1 about here.
___________________________
THE ROLE OF THE SHAME NEXUS IN INSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES
Here we begin by discussing the linkages among social bonds, systemic shame,
subjectification, and persons’ sense of shame. We then explain their joint roles in institutional
reproduction. In essence, systemic shame and a person’s sense of shame operate in concert as a
form of disciplinary power to animate persons’ self-regulation, normally preventing
transgressive behaviors. We then present episodic shaming, in the form of shaming attempts, as a
purposive exercise of juridical power. Shaming attempts trigger sensemaking among targets and
observers, which shape how they respond. When either systemic shame or episodic shaming
operate to induce conforming enactments, institutional reproduction occurs; when they fail to
induce conforming enactments, institutional change can occur.
Systemic Shame and Subjectification
Felt shame’s effect on persons stems in large part from the fact that the maintenance of
social bonds is a “crucial human motive” (Scheff, 1990:4; cf. Leary, 2000; Tracy & Robins,
2004). People maintain social bonds principally through ongoing reciprocal ratification of their
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standing as valued persons within a social group (Goffman, 1959; Scheff, 1990). The
anticipation, avoidance, or actual experience of felt shame are critical mechanisms that animate
the process of reciprocal ratification. These mechanisms alert a person to the state of his or her
standing as a valued person (Leary, 2000), signaling the potential loss of valued social bonds
and, in many instances, triggering renewed efforts to preserve those bonds (Baumeister et al.,
2007). We argue that highlighting the centrality of social bonds to institutional processes – and
the anticipation, avoidance, or experience of felt shame as fundamental mechanisms in the
preservation of such bonds – adds an important dimension to existing understandings of
institutional inhabitants as social persons.
The very same systems of social bonds are critical to persons’ lived experience of
institutional arrangements and the construction of the self. For example, Friedland and Alford
highlight the role of systems of “observable social relations” in both concretizing
institutionalized systems of meaning and “connect[ing] this world to the transrational order.”
Through these concrete social relations, not only do “individuals and organizations strive to
achieve their ends, but they also make life meaningful and reproduce those symbolic systems”
(Friedland & Alford, 1991:249). For rhetorical simplicity we will refer to these systems of
observable social relations using the terms social group and community in their vernacular sense.
Systemic shame. We argue that the high existential stakes of life and meaning derived
from important social bonds set the stage for disciplinary power. What makes felt shame, the
experienced threat of separation from a valued community, and the “social dislocation”
(Willmott, 2011) that it represents, an impetus for members? If persons lose their ties to valued
social relations, they risk losing their connection to the symbolic systems that make their lives
meaningful. We argue therefore that the role of felt shame in signaling a threat to social bonds
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makes it not only a very powerful social emotion, but also a strong normative force that is
exercised as disciplinary power, which we call systemic shame.
Drawn from the Foucauldian (1990) view that power is relational or an effect of social
relationships, the concept of systemic or disciplinary power refers to a form of power that works
through mundane practices to institutionalize a social reality and invest it with a quality of
objectivity (Lawrence, 2008). Although the terms systemic and disciplinary can be used
interchangeably, each communicates something distinctly important. Labeling power as systemic
connotes its ever-present and all-encompassing nature. Labeling it as disciplinary captures its
effect on people, who are disciplined into conformity with established understandings. For
simplicity, we label the construct systemic shame, because systemic shame disciplines.
Disciplinary power operates through the construction of a seemingly objective social
reality that elicits conformity. This conformity is achieved through two processes: normalization
and subjectification (Cooper et al., 2008:682). The importance of normalization to institutional
compliance is perhaps clear on its face: it defines what is normal and what is not, what is in
bounds and what is not. Subjectification refers to the ways in which disciplinary power is
implicated in providing identity and motives to persons. It operates through quotidian practices
that engage persons in ongoing ways to shape their self-conceptions and desires. Both
normalization and subjectification often are unapparent or invisible even as they discipline,
rendering people “orderly and regimented” (Cooper et al., 2008:682). The importance of
subjectification to institutional compliance and reproduction is subtler than that of normalization,
however. Not only does subjectification provide the person with identity and the perception of
agency (a sense of autonomy and motivation), it enlists and relies on that subject’s agency in
self-regulation to have its effect (Cooper et al., 2008:682).
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In describing systemic shame as a form of disciplinary power, we mean that it is a
relational, distributed, and often invisible form of power operating in social groups and
communities. This power works to make shared rules of what constitutes shameful (as opposed
to praiseworthy) behavior seem objective, such that each rule becomes taken-for-granted as
objectively correct or natural. At the same time, these rules penetrate community members’
identity constructions as they strive to meet conditions for ongoing membership through enacting
praiseworthy rather than shameful ways of being. Systemic shame, then, can be understood as a
technology of subjectification that “categorizes the individual, marks him by his own
individuality, attaches him to his own identity, imposes a law of truth on him which he must
recognize and which others have to recognize in him. It is a form of power which makes
individuals subjects” (Foucault, 1982:781). Thus, systemic shame shapes the people we become:
subjects equipped with a sense of shame. So constituted and equipped, we are perpetually
preoccupied with the ratification of our standing as valued persons (Scheff, 1990, 2005). In other
words, systemic shame enlists us in ubiquitous processes of self-surveillance and self-regulation
that underpin its disciplinary power.
Sense of shame. The sense of shame is the critical surveillance mechanism underpinning
systemic shame’s disciplinary power. Following Sayer, we see the sense of shame as
… an important mechanism in the production of social order, for through it people
internalize expectations, norms, and ideals and discipline and punish themselves. [It] is
one of the mechanisms by which people are ensnared by cultural discourses and norms,
in all their diversity, although the metaphor of being ensnared is too passive, for the need
for recognition, whose pursuit always carries the risk of failing and being shamed, drives
us to seek out ways of acting virtuously from among the many possibilities. (Sayer,
2005:955)
The sense of shame is internal to a person and we theorize that it is comprised of four
components: a person’s capacity for shame, knowledge of the conditions for shame,
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intersubjective surveillance, and self-regulation. Like our capacity for language, the capacity for
shame is innate; almost all persons can have the visceral experience of felt shame. Of course, the
capacity for shame varies across individuals in terms of its intensity, but the inability to
experience emotions like felt shame is considered pathological (Blair, 1995). In contrast, what
we call knowledge of the conditions for shame – those normative expectations regarding what
constitutes shameful behavior – is acquired through socialization in valued communities and
personal history. Based on our knowledge of the conditions for shame, persons engage in vigilant
intersubjective surveillance, as we assess others’ possible depreciation of the self. This
intersubjective surveillance underpins self-regulation, the anticipation and avoidance of the
possibility of felt shame through the managing of our performance as valuable persons.
According to Scheff, a critical implication of Goffman is that a sense of shame is “especially
important for social control … because although members may only occasionally feel shame,
they are constantly anticipating it” (2000:97).
A sense of shame manifests in a form of self-monitoring that involves one’s taking the
perspective of others and imagining their assessment of the self. Similarly, Leary (2000) used the
metaphor of a “sociometer” to refer to our motivation and capacity to understand our sociorelational standing, and particularly to attend to “relational devaluation,” or “indications that
others do not regard their relationship with the individual to be as important, close, or valuable as
the individual desires” (2000:336). This continuous self-monitoring relies on an intersubjectivity
that is the fundamental mechanism underpinning human social interactions. Intersubjectivity
refers to the sharing of subjective states by two or more persons such that it creates among them
a common social and cognitive world, thereby enabling the social construction of objectivity
(Meyerson, 2001). In the sense of shame, however, the concept of intersubjectivity looms larger,
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according to Scheff (1990, 2005), because it implies that in order to avoid felt shame, we
continuously “live in the minds of others” (Cooley, 1922/2004) often without being conscious of
it. Indeed, we are constantly assessing our behaviors in the “looking glass” (Cooley, 1902) of
what we imagine are others’ assessments and potentially finding ourselves wanting. The looking
glass self, like the renowned panopticon, becomes the vantage point from which all can be
monitored. This is the critical importance of intersubjective surveillance: everyone plays the
roles of the watcher and the watched.
It is important to note that through its ensnaring of persons in a community’s
constructions of the conditions for shame, the sense of shame enables self-regulation even when
a person is not actively participating in the source community’s system of relations. In this way,
the sense of shame becomes sedimented over time in the person so that the subjectifying effects
of systemic shame can far exceed the disciplinary power of membership in concrete
communities. Indeed, a person’s self-regulation need not be oriented only toward maintaining
concrete relations with a specific community or specific person in the here and now. In essence,
the assessments of parents, respected mentors, or valued others may shape our self-regulation
after they are long since gone. We argue that the sedimented sense of shame reflects the effects
of historical bonds, like a carried community; people carry their sedimented sense of shame into
every interaction.
Self regulation. For the purposes of our argument, the crux is that such intense ongoing
intersubjectivity implies people are not atomized but rather are ever-alert members of social
units, where the maintenance of valued social bonds through reciprocal ratification is crucial.
Thus, neither systemic shame, the sense of shame, nor the self-regulation they engender are
occasionally triggered phenomena that break into the social order; they are critical, ubiquitous
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parts of that social order. As Turner and Stets note, “the monitoring of self by a person is
virtually continuous, even in solitude when others are not present, and this monitoring always
generates an evaluation of self” (2005:154). To paraphrase Scheff (2005), a proper understanding
of the sense of shame and the intersubjective nature of the emotional/relational world implies
that in fact we all swim in a sea of shame, all day, every day.
To restate our argument, systemic shame is a form of power that disciplines through the
operation of persons’ internalized sense of shame. By connecting self-regulation and discipline
to the enactment of institutional prescriptions, the sense of shame will necessarily play some role
in the reproduction and maintenance of institutional arrangements. In other words, we suggest
that to varying degrees, which we discuss below, it is the anticipation and avoidance of felt
shame, together with a cognitive grasp of institutional prescriptions, which buttresses the
reproduction and maintenance of institutions. We argue that systemic shame underpins
institutional inhabitants’ self-regulation of their participation in institutional processes,
particularly maintenance and reproduction.
The duo of systemic shame and the sense of shame also suggests an explanation for why
institutional prescriptions are powerfully compelling: It is because they are rooted in social
bonds. In other words, while cognitions – the powerful taken-for-granted prescriptions of social
expectations – set the stage for social control, emotions and affective commitments provide the
impetus for compliance. As Scheff (1990:75) notes, “we experience [expectations/prescriptions]
as so compelling because of emotions, specifically, the pleasure of pride and fellow feeling, on
the one hand, and the punishment of … shame” on the other.
Our argument further suggests that to understand institutional reproduction and
maintenance, we need to consider not just institutional inhabitants’ cognitive constraints and
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practical awareness of institutional prescriptions, but also the emotional impetus that arises from
both the threat of rejection and the possibility of acceptance. From this perspective, people
respond powerfully to the anticipation or experience of felt shame because these signal when a
person’s actions threaten valued social bonds and whether work is needed to repair or preserve
them (Leary, 2000; Tracy & Robins, 2004). In addition, the internal and intersubjective nature of
the sense of shame means that systemic shame’s disciplinary power often exceeds that of formal
rewards and punishment, which are infrequent and costly (Goffman, 1963). In contrast, imagined
or anticipated experiences of social rejection are “virtually instantaneous, and invisible and
cheap as dirt” (Scheff, 1990:75).
In most cases, the disciplinary power of systemic shame is such that the person quickly
extinguishes or masks a transgression. The ubiquity of persons’ internal sense of shame, with its
ongoing intersubjective surveillance and self-regulation, means that most transgressions never
reach the point where they are noticed by others; instead, the transgressor recognizes a possible
breach and preemptively conforms. This implies that in situations where systemic shame is
strongly implicated in persons’ sense of shame, the need to police transgressions is likely to be
less frequent. But when transgressions are significant and noticed, they can trigger episodic
shaming.
Episodic Shaming and Institutional Reproduction and Change
Even modes of disciplinary power such as systemic shame may prove insufficient to
reproduce institutionalized prescriptions, especially in the face of institutional pluralism and
complexity that provide alternative prescriptions for persons as they navigate the social world
(Kraatz & Block, 2008; Seo & Creed, 2002). Where there are contradictory institutional
prescriptions, conformity with one can immediately imply nonconformity with another, thereby
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posing a threat to institutional reproduction. Consequently, in some settings, ensuring the
conformity that maintains institutions may become a recurring preoccupation. When
nonconformity crosses the line into a level of transgression that appears to threaten the
institutional order, shaming attempts can occur.
Episodic shaming. Shaming attempts are instances where a community or some of its
members seek to induce felt shame through the exercise of episodic shaming. These shaming
attempts carry implicit or explicit threats of temporary ostracism or even the permanent
sundering of social bonds. In other words, shaming attempts are situated, purposive uses of
episodic power to induce compliance with institutionalized community prescriptions. As such, it
is a form of agentic or juridical power because it involves more or less “discrete, strategic acts of
mobilization initiated by self-interested actors” (Lawrence, 2008:174).
We describe episodic shaming as a form of juridical power for two reasons. First, we
want to highlight that episodic shaming is purposively and strategically wielded by institutional
guardians to enforce and reinforce community prescriptions. Second, we want to draw a clear
contrast between the juridical power of episodic shaming and the disciplinary power of systemic
shame. Like systemic shame, episodic shaming requires the presence of the person’s sense of
shame as a core mechanism. Indeed, a person’s reaction to being the target of a shaming attempt
will likely be stronger when he or she has a robust sense of shame. However, unlike systemic
shame, the juridical power of episodic shaming relies on additional mechanisms embedded in
concrete relations – such as active threats of social dislocation – to induce the transgressor to
renewed conformity.
The specific techniques of shaming attempts will vary across settings and relationships
and they are legion. As we noted earlier, in the normal conduct of life systemic shame, our
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personal sense of shame, and our transgressions go largely unnoticed; we are usually unaware
that we swim in a sea of shame and our self-regulation may often be unconscious. Episodic
shaming, in contrast, exposes both a person’s transgressions and the ambit of their self-regulation
in ways that preclude turning a blind eye. Shaming attempts are indictments of the transgressor’s
failure at adequate self-regulation (e.g., “how could you,” “you should have known better”).
While episodic shaming coerces through mechanisms that can take the form of threatened or
enacted degradation, stigmatization, demonization, and ostracism, the actual techniques can be as
simple and specific as a reference to a shared memory, a fraught word, a disparaging tone.
Shaming mechanisms are endlessly diverse because they are situated in specific relationships.
This implies that in some situations episodic shaming can be a form of power that “reaches into
the very grain of individuals, touches their bodies and inserts itself into their actions and
attitudes, their discourses and learning processes and everyday lives” (Foucault, 1980:39).
Implicit in our discussion to this point is the central role of “interested actors” (Lawrence,
2008:174), or institutional guardians (DeJordy, 2010; Goffman, 1967; also see Dacin & Dacin,
2008) whom we call shamers. Because shamers have cognitive, emotional, and/or moral
commitments to existing prescriptions and patterns of social relations, they police the boundaries
of acceptable behavior. What all shaming attempts have in common is that they always entail the
threat of loss of standing as a valued person and social ostracism. Through episodic shaming,
shamers try to highlight and enforce acceptable patterns of behavior, motivated by a desire to
reinforce cherished norms and/or punish transgressors. In essence, shaming practices
complement other more widely discussed judicial, regulatory, and coercive compliance
mechanisms. Episodic shaming reduces the challenge to existing institutional meaning systems
by either bringing nonconformists back in line or by actually excluding them from the social
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system.
Further, we suggest that the power of overt shaming attempts goes beyond their ability to
target a specific transgressor; they cast a wider shadow. First, the stigma of the shaming attempt
can be felt by others associated with the transgressor (Hudson & Okhuysen, 2009; Pontikes,
Negro, & Rao, 2010). Second, the shaming attempts serve as a warning to “undetected”
transgressors and any other observers who might be tempted to cross the boundary of acceptable
behavior. Because felt shame typically occurs in the presence of others (Smith, Webster, Parrott,
& Eyre, 2002), witnesses vicariously experience the risk of felt shame and the threat of social
dislocation. This activates those witnesses’ internal sense of shame. In other words, as we watch
others being shamed, we come to understand how a similar transgression on our part can have
the same outcome, especially when we have the vicarious and perhaps even visceral experience
of felt shame ourselves. In short, episodic shaming can make salient for the target and for
witnesses the boundaries of acceptable behavior and invigorate their self-regulation, thereby
preserving institutional arrangements. For example, Dacin, Munir, and Tracey (2010) describe
how a head waiter, in his role as institutional guardian, openly scolded students who left the table
between courses of the meal to smoke for their allegedly “peasant” behavior, thereby reinforcing
not only Cambridge dining etiquette but also the British class structure among both targets and
observers. In this manner, observing episodic shaming will tend to reinforce witnesses’ internal
sense of shame, strengthen the disciplinary power of systemic shame, and also make it less likely
that shaming attempts will be necessary in the future.
Yet, the institutional order is only preserved if shaming attempts engender conformity, a
possibility we discuss next. Another possibility is that shaming attempts elicit rejection rather
than acceptance of the underlying definitions of normativity because, as Cooper and colleagues

23

have noted, exercises of juridical or agentic power are “endemically vulnerable to both overt and
covert resistance” (2008:683). We discuss this second possibility as well, showing how the two
trajectories of acceptance or rejection of shaming attempts lead to either institutional
maintenance or change.
Acceptance of shaming attempts. When transgression is noted, institutional guardians
may seek to directly engage the target’s sense of shame through episodic shaming, which can
trigger the person’s conscious sensemaking regarding the transgressive behavior (Baumeister et
al., 2007; Smith-Crowe & Warren, 2013). However, even when some in the community
recognize a transgression, a variety of strategies are possible for calling attention to the
transgression that fall short of episodic shaming. For instance, when breaking a social norm is
minor, accidental or unintended, members can turn a blind eye or find ways to allow the
transgressor to save face (Lok & De Rond, 2013). The transgressor may then be able to return to
conformity and the community fold relatively easily. Here, transgressors are unlikely to face
more severe sanctions if they also exhibit rejection of the violation, which can be done through a
variety of actions – a simple apology, prosocial behaviors, some display of contrition and/or act
of appeasement (Lok & De Rond, 2013; Martens, Tracy, & Shariff, 2012). In many cases,
actions that signal that the transgressor values the social bonds and wants to ratify his or her
standing as a valuable person can expiate the transgression and sustain the bond (Tracy &
Robins, 2004) .
In cases where the transgression is sufficiently serious, shamers may initiate a shaming
attempt targeting the transgressor. While persons’ self-regulation is often unconscious, becoming
the target of a shaming attempt can trigger a sudden self-awareness and sensemaking about the
transgression, one’s sense of shame, and the value of the implicated social bonds. All the cultural
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resources employed in this sensemaking are, of course, institutionally derived (Weber & Glynn,
2006). However, the complex, sedimented nature of persons’ sense of shame means that this
sensemaking can motivate a variety of specific adaptive responses, even as those responses
themselves are also institutionally derived. It is important to note, as will be detailed below, that
either acceptance or rejection of shaming attempts entails the operation of the person’s sense of
shame, particularly knowledge of the conditions for shame and self-regulation. Moreover,
episodic shaming is possible as an exercise of power only if the duo of systemic shame’s
disciplinary power and persons’ sense of shame create the conditions for it.
One possibility is that the transgressor will make sense of the shaming attempt and find
his or her performance shameful and so pursue renewed conformity (Cohen, Wolf, Panter, &
Insko, 2011; de Hooge, Zeelenberg, & Breugelmans, 2010; Gausel, Leach, Vignoles, & Brown,
2012; Grasmick, Bursik, & Kinsey, 1991; Panagopoulos, 2011). Another possibility is that the
transgressor, without necessarily attributing shamefulness to the self (Turner & Stets, 2005),
nonetheless conforms. In either case, if expiation of the breach and reaffirmation of the
prescription through renewed compliance are within the transgressor’s power, then acting to heal
the social bond is possible. How likely a transgressor is to take this path may hinge on one’s
situated sensemaking regarding several factors: the value of the social bond, the effort and social,
emotional, or material resources required for renewed conformity, and expectations of success.
Given the right mix of factors, the transgressor can respond to the shaming attempt through
compliance.
Rejection of shaming attempts. Transgressors may also reject shaming attempts (Combs,
Campbell, Jackson, & Smith, 2010). For instance, fully complying with expectations may
demand too much or may not even be within the transgressor’s power. This may be the case
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when the transgressive behavior is associated with personal characteristics that are stigmatized in
some settings, such as engaging in same-sex love (Creed, 2006) or styles of social behaviors
associated with poverty or lower social class origins (Gray & Kish-Gephart, In press). One
possible response here may be surface-level conformity, such as masking the offending behavior
or personal characteristic, “passing” as a “normal” person (DeJordy, 2008; Goffman, 1963).
Surface-level conformity, understood as a form of decoupling (DeJordy, 2008), may lead to
acceptance by others in the community. But that acceptance is potentially unstable as it is
contingent on the continued successful repression or masking of personal characteristics, which
can have great psychosocial costs (DeJordy, 2008).
The situation becomes more complicated as we consider some key implications of
Friedland and Alford’s (1991) assertion that systems of observable social relations make diverse
institutional prescriptions concrete and knowable to persons; each community distills distinct
prescriptions for its members. However, because modern persons are members of multiple
communities -- each of which can provide distinct distilled prescriptions – a given person’s
enactments can comprise a mix of responses to a variety of valued social bonds and institutional
prescriptions. While these diverse institutional prescriptions may cohere in some ways, they can
also conflict (Creed et al., 2010; Seo & Creed, 2002). In other words, persons’ multiple
memberships can result not only in contradictory prescriptions but also in potentially competing
pulls toward valued social groups. As a consequence, managing memberships in multiple
communities is potentially difficult because different communities give their members different
things about which they can experience felt shame (Sayer, 2005). In sum, not only can people
experience painful competing pulls toward different communities (Scheff, 1990), people can also
face situations where the institutional prescriptions of one social group conflict with the
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institutional prescriptions of another, such that what is seen as shameful in one group may be
judged irrelevant or even praiseworthy in another.
In the face of such competing pulls, a shaming attempt can present a person with a
particularly painful situation if its prescription entails violating the prescription of another valued
community. Paradoxically, at the same time, the target’s multiple memberships in valued social
groups can also provide diverse resources for navigating those contradictions. For example,
through multiple memberships, persons may learn strategies for passing or for enacting partial,
situated conformity (DeJordy, 2008; Goffman, 1963). Regardless of whether it actually elicits
felt shame or it simply alerts the target to threatened social bonds, what is important is that a
shaming attempt can induce sensemaking (Smith-Crowe & Warren, 2013), which is the first step
in navigating such contradictions.
A shame attempt’s triggering of sensemaking may have several important consequences.
First, sensemaking can affect the person’s sense of shame, potentially altering its scope and
content; for example, the person may cease to feel a particular behavior is shameful.
Consequently, the target may reject a shaming attempt by attributing it to a fault in the
institutional prescriptions, perhaps concluding that they are trivial or wrongheaded (Turner &
Stets, 2005). Second, a shaming attempt can also alter the value one places on a social bond. For
instance, targeted persons may reject the shaming attempt by rejecting those doing the shaming
(Combs et al., 2010; Hutcherson & Gross, 2011), perhaps coming to believe that the shamers do
not speak for the broader community, or by the target concluding that he or she no longer values
the broader community. Each of these effects enables the target’s possible rejection of the
shaming attempt.
The rejection of a shaming attempt can have implications for the juridical power of
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episodic shaming and the disciplinary power of systemic shame. First, the disciplinary power of
systemic shame is weakened if, as a consequence of the sensemaking triggered by episodic
shaming, a person’s sense of shame ceases to encompass a particular norm or prescription or if
the value of the social bond is diminished. We argue that such changes in the value of bonds or
in a person’s sense of shame are less likely during the routine and often unconscious selfregulation associated with systemic shame, but are more likely when episodic shaming triggers
sensemaking. Such counter-normative sensemaking is made more possible by the availability of
cultural and emotional resources arising from multiple memberships, which can provide
alternative institutional “building blocks of sensemaking” (Weber & Glynn, 2006:1644). These
resources can be drawn upon to resist or discredit the shaming attempt because they provide
alternative prescriptions of socially approved ways of being.
One possible route that the rejection of a shaming attempt can take is for the person to
exit the social group, severing the social bonds. Under conditions of multiple memberships, the
threat of social dislocation (Willmott, 2011) or the loss of other benefits associated with
membership motivates a search for and possibly a “move toward” (Gutierrez, Howard-Grenville,
& Scully, 2010:394) alternative social relations. These alternatives may be groups in which a
person already has membership or groups in which the person sees the possibility of meeting
psychosocial, emotional, or instrumental needs. A person can imagine movement or changes in
memberships because his or her memberships in more than one community have already
exposed him or her to alternative social groups and the different prescriptions for ways of being
that they offer. Exit may be particularly likely in situations where bonds with the shaming social
group are weaker, and the threat of social dislocation is less.
Exit as an option pertains only to concrete social groups. For example, GLBT persons can
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choose to reject the heterosexist teachings of the churches of their youth and either give up
church membership entirely or join more inclusive religious groups (Creed et al., 2010). Leaving
the church one was raised in, however, does not mean that one thereby escapes the disciplinary
power of systemic shame, as the quip that one is “in recovery” from one’s religious upbringing
suggests. Even lapsed community members are likely to carry aspects of abandoned
communities with them; this is another example of the sedimented nature of the sense of shame.
Another possible route that rejection of a shaming attempt can take is voice (Hirschman,
1970). In the organizational literature, voice has referred to efforts to communicate grievances
and propose actions to improve working relations or practices (Hoffmann, 2006; Zhou &
George, 2001). Here, we use it to refer to a person’s remaining in the social group and embracing
some elements while rejecting or challenging others. Possibilities for voice stem from and are
amplified by heterogeneity in institutional prescriptions and community memberships.
Consequently, it is likely that some members of a particular group may feel stronger cognitive,
instrumental, and affective commitments to some of the institutional elements in the group’s
distinct mix of prescriptions than to others. Such blends of commitments and attachments enable
voice. In practice, this allows for the transgressor’s rejection of a shaming attempt (and the
institutional prescriptions that underpin it) while remaining within the community, where the
member can find kindred spirits with whom to attempt to transform the institutional
arrangements from the inside (Gutierrez et al., 2010). We argue that such a response is more
likely when members feel a strong affective commitment to the social relationships and to some
parts of the institutionalized beliefs and systems of meanings, even while rejecting other parts.
As before, the resistance to or discrediting of a shaming attempt is possible because
memberships in multiple communities provide members with materials to imagine new
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institutional configurations and social arrangements. In other words, it is often the multiple
memberships, affective commitments, and alternative sensemaking that enable or empower
persons to remain a part of social groups attempting to shame them, yet resist or discredit those
shaming attempts.
Summary
To summarize, the shame nexus is implicated in a range of institutional processes through
the subjectification of the self-regulating persons who inhabit institutions. Systemic shame, a
form of disciplinary power, works in concert with persons’ internalized sense of shame to
discipline institutional inhabitants so that they engage in intersubjective surveillance and selfregulation to avoid felt shame. This self-regulation underpins institutional reproduction.
Systemic shame and peoples’ sense of shame also create the conditions for the purposive
exercise of juridical power in the form of episodic shaming, which can be used to curb
transgressive behavior and reassert the appropriateness of institutional prescriptions. Whether or
not shaming attempts lead to felt shame, they can trigger sensemaking among community
members that may result in the reassessment of community prescriptions and bonds. In the next
section we address how such reassessments can shape institutional inhabitants’ motivations to
engage in the work of institutional maintenance, disruption, or creation.
THE SHAME NEXUS AND INSTITUTIONAL WORK
So far in our discussion we have drawn attention to the intricate ways systemic shame
and episodic shaming play a role in subjectifying persons through providing the critical content
of persons’ sense of shame, the specific knowledge of the conditions for shame. In doing so, we
have offered an enhanced picture of the cross-level constitution of institutional inhabitants. Now
we bring these persons into the inhabited institutional processes (Scully & Creed, 1997) that

30

have been called institutional work (Lawrence et al., 2011; Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006;
Lawrence et al., 2009), to suggest more concretely how consideration of the shame nexus can
enhance institutional analysis by helping to explain institutional maintenance, institutional
disruption, and institutional creation and change (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006).
The Shame Nexus and Institutional Maintenance
Lawrence and Suddaby (2006) define the work of institutional maintenance as
supporting, repairing, or recreating the mechanisms that ensure institutional stability.
Examinations of mechanisms of stability at the micro-foundational level, however, have so far
focused primarily on cognitive (Zucker, 1977) and normative (Friedland, 2002; Scott, 2007)
processes. A focus on the shame nexus opens a window to additional mechanisms.
Systemic shame and conformity. As institutional persistence requires conformity with
institutional prescriptions, an important question is the manner in which such conformity is
elicited in institutional inhabitants. That is, what are the micro-foundations of conformity to
institutional prescriptions? The interdependent operation of systemic shame and persons’ sense
of shame helps explain one way in which conformity is elicited. As persons engage in processes
of reciprocal ratification of their standing as valued persons, they internalize the expectations of
others as well as the knowledge of the conditions for felt shame. This learning unfolds within the
context of systemic shame and becomes sedimented in persons’ sense of shame in ways that
reinforce their joint disciplinary power. Systemic shame, working in concert with persons’ sense
of shame, is ubiquitous and constant, and has a central role to play in explaining the selfregulation and resulting conformity to institutional prescriptions that is one micro-foundation of
institutional maintenance.
While the ubiquitous disciplinary nature of systemic shame may seem conceptually
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inconsistent with the notions of personal effort and intentionality that are emphasized in the
institutional work perspective, we nonetheless argue that systemic shame’s operation in
institutional maintenance relies on important forms of institutional work. Intersubjective
surveillance, self-regulation, and shame avoidance entail persons’ constant application of cultural
knowledge and vigilant effort. Lok and De Rond (2013) argue that such effort marks selfcorrection as a form of institutional work. Although the behavioral regulation is perhaps more
often self- than other-directed, it is not exclusively so. The ideas of intersubjective surveillance,
of living in the minds of others, and of the “looking glass self” all speak to a form of mutual
regulation where persons’ self-assessments reflect the imagined assessments of others; again, we
are all both the watchers and the watched. In addition, whether unconscious or intentional, shame
avoidance is intricately intertwined with other forms of institutional maintenance, including the
preservation of community bonds and the construction of the self as a community member in
good standing. Finally, some manifestations of self-regulation likely have important indirect
effects that may be intentional, such as affirming community prescriptions and modeling and
validating compliance. Together these features of persons’ complicity in the operation of
systemic shame’s disciplinary power suggest that living subject to one’s sense of shame is a
distinct but fundamental form of institutional work that extends across a wide spectrum of
institutional orders in ways that discrete strategic acts of maintenance do not.
Episodic shaming and conformity. In addition to being a product of the joint operation
of systemic shame and the sense of shame, conformity can also be a possible response to
exercises of episodic shaming. Conformity in the wake of shaming attempts, in all its guises, can
have important consequences that can maintain and strengthen institutional arrangements,
including systemic shame. For the transgressor, for instance, renewed conformity may lead to
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continued flows of material and emotional resources associated with community membership or
strong social bonds. From an affective perspective, continued interaction with others in the
community can generate positive emotions for the members (Cialdini et al., 1976), enhancing
feelings of emotional solidarity (Scheff, 1990), thereby leading to greater emotional commitment
to institutional prescriptions (Voronov & Vince, 2012). But in conforming after a shaming
attempt, targets engage in institutional maintenance work through the proper reenactment of
previously transgressed institutional prescriptions, thereby strengthening institutional
arrangements through repair of the breach, reaffirmation of the prescription, and reinforcement
of members’ sense of shame. Importantly, conformity contributes to maintenance of the
institutional order regardless of whether it is genuine and simulated.
While it is possible that in many cases of episodic shaming enhanced self-regulation and
institutional maintenance are relatively unthinking, in other cases the return to conformity is
more deliberate. One example mentioned earlier is passing, or the surface-level simulation of
conformity, to mask transgressive behavior or stigmatized identity (DeJordy, 2008). For
example, Hudson and Okhuysen (2009) find that customers of men’s bathhouses avail
themselves of the anonymous membership cards, hidden locations, and nondescript architecture
of bathhouses to keep their patronage of these sex venues hidden. In patronizing the bathhouses
while keeping that patronage as secret as possible, these customers mask their sexual practices as
a form of self-regulation; they take advantage of the structures of anonymity that the bathhouses
provide to avoid episodic shaming and stigmatization in the broader community. Curiously, this
makes passing a complex form of praxis (Benson, 1977) in which customers effectively perform
institutional work to maintain two seemingly contradictory institutions: the bathhouse as a
hidden institution of gay culture and the broader community’s institutional prescriptions that
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judge patronizing men’s bathhouses to be shameful.
Conforming in response to shaming episodes contributes to institutional maintenance in
ways beyond the behavioral changes of transgressors who conform. The transgressor’s renewed
conformity also validates the shamers’ standing in the community as guardians of
institutionalized notions of appropriateness, thereby reinforcing community members’ use of
juridical power in the work of institutional defense (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Maguire &
Hardy, 2009). Moreover, the drama of transgression, episodic shaming, contrition, and
conformity also serves a didactic purpose for the broader community. Through the performance
of defense work (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Maguire & Hardy, 2009) the symbolic meaning
structures around the threatened institutional prescriptions and roles are re-negotiated (Hallett &
Ventresca, 2006) but ultimately reaffirmed in the interaction between the shamers and the
transgressor. In such situations the sequence of transgression, episodic shaming, and repair
provide opportunities for both individual and collective institutional work that reinforce
institutional practices and symbolic constructions.
Boundary conditions for the shame nexus in institutional maintenance. Naturally,
there are also some boundary conditions to consider when using the shame nexus to understand
persons’ conformity as an instance of institutional maintenance work. In general, systems of
social control, such as the shame nexus, can vary in terms of the intensity of approval or
disapproval different communities attach to institutional prescriptions (Gelfand et al., 2011) and
the degree of consensus or consistency with which a norm is shared across members (O'Reilly,
1989). The greater the consensus, the greater the number of potential shamers. Where there is
less consensus regarding the definitions of what constitutes shameful behavior or the
commitment to those definitions is less intense, there will likely be greater tolerance for various
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forms of nonconformity and even for transgressive behavior. In addition, shaming attempts
which are designed to enforce or reinforce a prescription with low consensus or intensity may
not only prove fruitless but may further weaken the force of the prescription. Each of these
conditions would make the shame nexus a weaker mechanism of control.
The viability of intersubjective surveillance, self-regulation, and episodic shaming as
mechanisms will also vary across groups based on patterns of interaction and shared cultural
standards; the more dense the patterns of interaction and the stronger the hold of common
cultural backgrounds (Douglas, 2013; Lawrence, 2008), the more likely the shame nexus will
figure strongly in the work of institutional maintenance. In contrast, the shame nexus is likely to
operate at lower intensities in communities where social bonds are weaker and a sense of
belongingness is less central to members’ sense of self; together these could cause persons’ sense
of shame and self-regulation to be less robust (O'Reilly, 1989). This could be the case in settings
where membership is transitory, anonymous, or more transactional then relational. Wherever
widespread self-regulation is less dependent on either embeddedness in social bonds or the
degree to which persons’ sense of shame reflects consensus on prescriptions, other forms of
coercive mechanisms (Dacin et al., 2010; Hallett & Ventresca, 2006), such as formal laws and
rules, may be more important to elicit conformity and, consequently, play a stronger role in
enhancing institutional maintenance.
The Shame Nexus and Institutional Disruption
Lawrence and Suddaby (2006) define institutional work as disruption when it involves
attacking and undermining institutions, and when the goal is to subvert or replace existing
institutions. Our analysis of the shame nexus suggests one explanation for why people engage in
disruption work relative to specific institutional prescriptions. As mentioned earlier, institutional
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guardians (DeJordy, 2010) use episodic shaming as a tool in policing a community’s boundaries
of acceptable behavior (Zietsma & Lawrence, 2010). However, shaming attempts do not
automatically result in renewed conformity, especially when they lead the targeted transgressor
to engage in sensemaking regarding the basis for the shaming attempt. When the targets of
shaming attempts have memberships in multiple communities, they are more likely to have
access to alternative prescriptions or definitions of the conditions for shame that can serve as
lenses for evaluating the appropriateness of their own behavior. Such a reassessment of a
shaming attempt is made more possible by the reduced risk of social isolation arising from
membership in multiple communities; memberships in other communities provide “plausibility
structures” (Berger & Luckmann, 1967) that enable targets to envision alternative enduring
bonds and social arrangements. When these alternative lenses contradict the shaming
community’s evaluation of a transgression, the target may reject the shaming attempt rather than
renewing conformity.
Moreover, the availability of alternative prescriptions as resources for sensemaking can
lead the targets of shaming attempts to go beyond mere rejection of institutional prescriptions to
making negative external attributions that can produce feelings of anger (Brickley & Drunen,
1990; Lewis, 1992; Tangney et al., 2007). If the target judges the shaming attempt as unjustified,
that anger may then be directed at the shaming community and its institutional prescriptions,
and/or the shamers who initiated the shaming attempt. Possible actions may include subverting
the community, attacking it from within or from outside. It is the availability of alternative
prescriptions due to multiple memberships that lays the foundations for the work of disruption
(Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006) aimed at the shaming community and its prescriptions.
Gould (2002) provides an important example of disruption work in her account of the
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formation and activities of the AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power (ACT-UP). She describes the
process by which those who were both gay and infected with HIV responded to shame, stigma,
and rejection. In contrast to the lesbian and gay rights movement’s prior dismissal of direct
action as potentially counterproductive, ACT-UP became notorious for its highly disruptive use
of direct action to challenge the institutions that had minimized the importance of HIV/AIDS
(Elsbach & Sutton, 1992) because it was perceived as primarily a gay men’s disease. Through
highly symbolic actions such as widespread “die-ins,” mass public protests in which activists fell
down as if they were dying from HIV, and the disrupting of mass at St. Patrick’s Cathedral in
New York, ACT-UP challenged the inactivity, complacency, moralizing, and indifference of
government officials and the general public to the HIV epidemic. These attacks eventually led to
changes in policy and activity at important institutional agencies such as the Center for Disease
Control and Prevention, the National Institutes of Health, and hospitals and clinics, as well as
city and state governments throughout the U.S. The motivations arising from GLBT persons’
lived experience of the shame nexus (Shiltz, 1988) are central to this case of institutional
disruption.
Boundary conditions for the shame nexus in institutional disruption. As with the work
of institutional maintenance, certain conditions pertaining to heterogeneity within and across
communities are likely to bound the role of the shame nexus in institutional disruption. These
boundary conditions have to do with the density of interactions, the intensity with which specific
prescriptions are embraced (Gelfand et al., 2011) or rejected, and the level of community
consensus regarding the appropriateness of those prescriptions (O'Reilly, 1989). For instance, if
the operation of the shame nexus is ubiquitous and constant, an important question remains:
Under what conditions will it lead persons to engage in disruption? The ACT-UP case enables
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some tentative answers. For persons with stigmatized identities, prevailing institutional
arrangements are always disadvantageous, if not painful and enraging. The negative effects of
the lived experience of the shame nexus can accumulate until some point of discontinuity, like
the HIV/AIDS crisis. Such discontinuities can create the conditions for a reassessment of
dominant institutional conditions for shame – and for the intensification of collective
mobilization in shamed communities. As we have argued before, multiple memberships and the
presence of plausible institutional alternatives (Berger & Luckmann, 1967) will likely play a
role. Such a reassessment of the dominant conditions for shame can crystalize different
sensemaking resources and, as the rapid increase in ACT-UP’s use of direct action shows, new
institutional practices designed for the work of disruption.
The Shame Nexus and Institutional Creation and Change
An additional form of institutional work pertains to the formulation of institutions, either
through the creation of new institutions or the change of existing ones. (Change in this context is
distinct from disruption, which Lawrence and Suddaby (2006) use to refer to the work of
undermining and replacing institutions, as noted above.) The role of the shame nexus in the
creation of new institutions and the change of existing ones can be most clearly seen through the
lens of voice, which we have used to refer to persons’ vocal rejecting or challenging of particular
community prescriptions while remaining within a community. In addition, episodic shaming in
particular may be a key mechanism in the micro-foundations of institutional change when
persons who have been the targets of shaming attempts remain members of the community while
challenging both shamers and the prescriptions they represent. In voice, transgressors refuse
either to be silent or to go away.
As noted, shaming attempts can serve as triggers for critical sensemaking on the part of
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targets and other community members. In situations where targets with strong affective
commitments to a community not only question the validity of the shaming attempt, but also
conclude that the flaw lies not with themselves but with the shamers or the community’s
prescriptions, they may choose to remain within the community and engage in change activity
from within. This work can be done by finding allies within the community and by forming
coalitions that contest particular prescriptions and engage in the work of reconfiguring the
community’s belief systems. Staying and finding other kindred spirits sustains some aspects of
the community while reforming others, making voice in this case more a form of institutional
change than creation (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006).
While institutional disruption may involve a wholesale rejection of a social group’s
institutional prescriptions, and entail exit, and attack from outside, voice represents a selective
reengagement with what we have referred to as a social group’s distinctive distillation of diverse
– and perhaps conflicting – institutional prescriptions. This selective reengagement can involve
careful and deliberate consideration and evaluation of the different institutional prescriptions as
separate strands in the social fabric. This suggests that as a form of institutional work, voice may
have less to do with institutional boundaries, behavioral conformity or disruption, and more to do
with the institutional core beliefs, which may be subject to active renegotiation through voice
(Creed, 2003; Creed & Scully, 2000; Meyerson & Scully, 1995).
Creed, DeJordy and Lok’s (2010) research on the identity work of gay, lesbian, bisexual
and transgender (GLBT) ministers provides an illustration of how the shame nexus and voice
figure in the work of institutional change. For the GLBT ministers in their study, church
definitions of the conditions for shame had existential impact because the widely held
institutional claim that GLBT people were unfit for Christian ministry reached beyond the
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alleged shamefulness of specific sexual behaviors to GLBT identity more broadly. The ministers
in the study initially internalized heterosexist prescriptions, constructing self-narratives rife with
felt shame, compartmentalization, and denial, even as they tried to pursue their deeply felt
callings to Christian ministry. Many also tried to pass as heterosexual, even marrying opposite
sex partners to hide their stigmatized identities, in order to sustain their ties to their church
communities. Unable to sustain the painful contradictions between their understandings of the
inclusiveness of the Christian Gospel, on the one hand, and the deeply internalized felt shame
fostered by definitions of the conditions for shame prevailing in their denominations, on the
other, they engaged in the work of reconciling their sexual identities with their faith. In this
process they drew on a variety of sensemaking resources, including but not limited to liberation
theology and emerging directions in biblical scholarship, feminism, and the histories of diverse
civil rights struggles, including the contemporary GLBT rights movement. Consequently, the
ministers came to believe that nothing inherent to GLBT identity or sexual expression excluded
persons from the love of God and further, came to believe that heterosexism is antithetical to the
core messages of the Gospel. Ultimately, these strong rejections of the conditions for shame they
had grown up with enabled them to claim and use ministerial roles for change within their
denominations and their local congregations, affirming inclusive tenets of Christian theology
while challenging the shaming heterosexist orthodoxies of their denominations.
Boundary conditions for the shame nexus in institutional creation & change. Several
factors suggest some boundary conditions for the role of the shame nexus in institutional creation
and change. First, to the extent that valued social bonds or affective commitments are strong,
persons may see exit from a community as too painful an option, strengthening their motivation
to engage in voice. At the same time, persons who are stigmatized due to the operation of
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systemic shame or are the targets of episodic shaming must have access to diverse sensemaking
resources, likely stemming from membership in multiple communities, if they are to be equipped
to reject the shaming attempt. Moreover, to the extent that others who are not the objects of
stigma or targets of episodic shaming also reject the same institutional prescriptions, the presence
of allies may strengthen the transgressors’ resolve. Under such conditions, persons may be more
motivated to remain and work for change within the community, rather than exit. This implies
that the shame nexus may be more likely to lead to institutional change in communities where
persons have diverse sensemaking resources for reassessing contested institutional prescriptions,
where potential allies are present, and where strong affective commitments make exit
unappealing.
Although our three illustrations happen to show the institutional work of what appears to
be the same stigmatized group, these illustrations show distinct heterogeneity: proprietors and
customers of businesses (men’s bathhouses), movement activists advocating changes in health
policy and access to health care (ACT-UP), and professionals negotiating their fit within
organizations (Christian ministers). Our illustrations also span several institutional realms –
organizational, political, and religious – and types of institutional work. We believe this
heterogeneity shows the broad applicability of the shame nexus in institutional processes.
DISCUSSION
Despite an increased emphasis on people, social interaction, and work, institutionalism
has yet to adequately answer the question of “what are we to do about people” (Hallett &
Ventresca, 2006:230). In response, our work contributes to institutional theory by expanding and
elaborating the embryonic emotions in institutions perspective (e.g., Creed et al., 2010; Voronov
& Vince, 2012) by bringing whole persons into better focus through attending to the role of a
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single emotion, shame. Through our theorizing of the shame nexus, we offer a cross-level
account of the mechanisms through which shame affects persons’ participating in institutional
processes. Our analysis also points beyond the shame nexus to the potential importance of other
concrete emotions, particularly the social emotions that underlie and animate persons’ social
bonds (Leary, 2000; Tangney et al., 2007; Tracy & Robins, 2004; Turner & Stets, 2005). In this
section we present some implications of our analysis for institutional theory and suggest some
areas where further work is warranted.
Subjectification, Institutional Inhabitants, and Institutionalization
The nagging question of “what are we to do about people” suggests that one way to
advance institutional theory is to dwell more attentively with a key implication of the inhabited
institutions perspective: both the negotiation of institutional meanings and practices and the
constitution of institutional inhabitants are embedded in systems of social bonds. Deeper
attention to social bonds and their effects on persons’ sense of shame and self regulation matters
because institutional inhabitants are not merely carriers of institutions, but rather are persons,
with affective commitments and emotional stakes, who together instantiate and reproduce
institutions through their symbolic interactions. It bears repeating that in institutionalization “it is
not simply what people ‘do’ that matters, but what they do ‘together’” (Hallett & Ventresca,
2006: 216). To understand the dynamics and processes of what they do together, we need to have
a better understanding of the nature and effects of the social “connective tissues” that bind them
(Hallett & Ventresca, 2006: 224).
Our theorizing of the sense of shame and systemic shame also makes clearer some key
linkages between the constitution of people and what they do together, between subjectification
and institutionalization. We argue that while enacting institutions, persons intersubjectively live
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in the minds of others, self-regulate, and avoid shame. This implies that inhabiting an institution
requires work on two fronts, shame avoidance and institutional enactment, with performance of
one intertwined with performance of the other.
In this vein, our analysis responds to broader concerns about the ways in which
institutionalism conceives of actors, subjectification, and power. Cooper and colleagues
(2008:675), building on (Hasselbladh & Kalinikos, 2000), argue that institutional theorists have
largely ignored how institutionalization as a process actually relies on “its capacity to constitute
distinct forms of actorhood;” better explanations of institutional reproduction and change will
hinge on attending to the constitution of actors as subjects whose commitments to
institutionalized practices and beliefs are both the product and engine of institutionalization. By
exploring the joint operation of systemic shame and the sense of shame, we identify them as core
drivers of the subjectification and the self-regulation that animates persons’ participation in
processes of institutionalization.
As a result, we show institutionalization as accomplished, at least in part, through
ongoing patterns of subjectification that are manifested in a person’s sedimented sense of shame,
the distinct internalization of his or her communities’ conditions for felt shame. Rather than
either the atomized, autonomous individual with a discrete consciousness who is allegedly doing
institutional work (Willmott, 2011) or the already familiar social person of the inhabited
institutions perspective, we find a person’s whose subjectivity has at its heart the personal sense
of shame and who continuously lives in the minds of others (Scheff, 1990). The institutional
inhabitants who engage in the symbolic interactions through which the contours of institutions
are negotiated have not only shared cognitions about institutional prescriptions, but also strong
emotional impetus to preserve valued social bonds and their standing as valued persons within
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the communities constituted by those bonds.
If institutionalization indeed relies on the constitution of distinct forms of actorhood, as
Cooper and colleagues (2008) suggest, institutional theory needs to attend explicitly not only to
the cognitive content of persons’ systems of self-regulation, such as shared beliefs and
assumptions, but also to the affective content (Creed et al., 2010; Voronov & Vince, 2012). In
particular, this means the nature of their social bonds and their sense of shame. If a sense of
shame is a crucial facet of the constitution of institutional inhabitants, then wherever there are
persons inhabiting institutional arrangements, some aspect of the shame nexus should operate.
Therefore, one of the things institutionalists could do in response to the question “what are we to
do about people” is to conduct further research on when, how, and to what degree persons’ sense
of shame, their ongoing self-regulation, and their vigilant shame avoidance shape their enactment
of particular institutional prescriptions and their inclination to engage in institutional work.
Sedimentation of the Sense of Shame and Institutional Work
A key concern in institutional theory focuses on accounting for differences in persons’
inclination and capacity to engage in institutional work (Lawrence et al., 2011). Our
investigation suggests that one important factor in shaping persons’ inclination is the lived
experience of the shame nexus. We believe future work should also explore how a person’s
capacity for institutional work might also bear the mark of one’s history of self-regulation,
shame avoidance, felt shame, and sensemaking in the wake of episodic shaming, whether the
latter is as shamer, target, or observer.
We also argue that persons’ sense of shame will be complex in its content due to their
membership in multiple communities. For example, our analysis of alternative responses to
episodic shaming hinges on the argument that persons who are members of multiple systems of
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relationships can face contradictory prescriptions such that what one community sees as
acceptable enactments another might see as transgressive. It is widely argued that such
institutional contradictions may make room for choice and alternative forms of action (Friedland,
2012; Friedland & Alford, 1991; Seo & Creed, 2002), that the lived experience of institutional
contradiction somehow creates the conditions and may even equip the person for institutional
work (Creed et al., 2010). Yet, when prescriptions rooted in valued social bonds conflict,
choosing among those affective ties or reconciling their competing demands is not merely an
instance of cognitive problem-solving; choice and action may entail considerable social and
emotional cost and effort (Creed et al., 2010). Although some choices may reflect purely
instrumental calculations, other choices may also involve changing or breaking valued affective
ties.
The different values placed on those affective ties suggest how a person’s sense of shame
is sedimented; it is the product of persons’ unfolding histories in multiple, diverse systems of
social relations, of varying weight and importance, and the particular patterns of subjectification
and emotional commitments that such social relations entail. We have shown how systemic
shame serves as a linkage or tie to the various communities that anchor the processes of
subjectification through which we emerge as persons. We suggest that the inclination and
capacity to engage in specific types of institutional work are tempered through the lived
experience of sedimented solidarities and commitments (Meyerson & Scully, 1995) which the
person can experience as an irreconcilable tension between the promise of ongoing kinship and
the threat of social dislocation (Willmott, 2011). Such lived experiences of competing
memberships and institutional contradictions shape one’s participation in institutional processes.
Our analysis leads us to conclude that persons’ capacity to engage in the work of
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institutional disruption or change in particular may be particularly limited by valued social bonds
and commitments to the enactments that sustain those bonds. Therefore, a second thing
institutionalists could do in response to the question “what are we to do about people” is to study
the sedimented sense of shame of the inhabitants of particular institutional settings and
communities. One possible avenue could be the explicit incorporation of the shame nexus into
studies of institutional biography, “the exploration of specific individuals in relation to the
institutions that structured their lives and that they worked to create, maintain, or disrupt”
(Lawrence et al., 2011:55). We contend that scholars using institutional biography as a means for
accounting for the motivation and capacity to engage in institutional work will need to look not
only at a person’s sedimented beliefs and shared systems of meaning, but also his or her lived
experience of the shame nexus across time. Several recent accounts of socialization processes in
complex institutional settings offer promising models for this approach (Anteby, 2013; Dacin et
al., 2010; Lok & De Rond, 2013).
The Sense of Shame, Reflexivity, and the Conditions for Work
Another important implication of the shame nexus pertains to the issue of reflexivity as a
condition for critical assessments of institutional prescriptions and agency. We argue that a
sense of shame is a key element of personal reflexivity. In the institutional literature, the issue of
reflexivity has figured both in discussions of the nature of agency (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998)
and in theorizing of the role of institutional contradiction in dialectical processes and praxis for
institutional change (Seo & Creed, 2002). For example, Emirbayer and Mische (1998) conceive
of agency in terms of a combination of three temporally-rooted action orientations. The
backward-looking, “iterative” orientation fosters the unreflexive reproduction of institutional
arrangements. In contrast, the “projective” and “practical-evaluative” orientations require an
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agentic reflexivity regarding what is imaginable in the future, given knowledge of multiple
existing arrangements, and what is currently practicable, given present conditions and
constraints. Emirbayer and Mische argue that what enables actors to move from unreflexive
institutional reproduction to the more reflexive orientations of critique and pragmatic action for
change is encountering problematic situations – that is, situations that both require a reflexive
distance from established patterns and enable greater imagination and conscious choice. Linking
this argument to dialectical analysis, Seo and Creed (2002) argue that the lived experience of
social contradictions makes a shift in personal and collective consciousness increasingly likely.
However, in theorizing the role of reflexivity in embedded agency, institutional theorists have
mostly framed the necessary contradictions in terms of conflicting institutional logics (Battilana
& D’Aunno, 2009; Friedland & Alford, 1991; Seo & Creed, 2002). Recently, however, scholars
have begun to address how persons experience such contradictions emotionally as well (e.g.,
Creed et al., 2010; Dacin et al., 2010; Gray & Kish-Gephart, In press).
One consequence of conceptualizing contradiction largely in terms of institutional logics,
we argue, is a limited understanding of how emotions and persons’ memberships in multiple
communities figure in the development of reflexivity. Our analysis points to several ways of
expanding this understanding. First, we believe that competing social bonds and affective
commitments are essential features of the contradictions that make up the dialectical totality of
social arrangements in which institutional inhabitants are embedded. As the various communities
in which persons are members simultaneously mediate and distill competing institutional
prescriptions in their distinctive ways, they set the stage for interconnected patterns of
subjectification, and enable heterogeneous, “divergent, incompatible productions” of prescribed
ways of being within the larger totality of social relations (Benson, 1977:4). Importantly,
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persons’ sense of shame is a contradiction-ridden product of this dialectical process; we argue it
is a key motor of the reflexivity that underpins the work of disruption and creation.
We believe that under varying conditions, but perhaps especially in response to episodic
shaming, a sedimented sense of shame can bring the iterative, projective, and practicalevaluative orientations to bear in critical reassessments of prescribed ways of being. Ensuing
actions potentially affect changes in institutional arrangements and patterns of subjectification, in
a renewed dialectical cycle. Conceptualizing both the human experience of institutional
contradiction in terms of competing social bonds and the sense of shame as a driver of reflexivity
suggests that notions of institutional agency and work that do not attend to the valued social
bonds put at risk by institutional change may systematically underestimate the role of shame
avoidance, social dislocation, and anomie in impeding institutional work (Willmott, 2011).
Therefore, a third thing institutionalists could do in response to the question “what do we do
about people” is to study heretofore unaddressed affective dimensions of the links among
reflexivity, agency and institutional work, examining how persons’ efforts may be conditioned or
constrained not only in terms of sedimented logics (Seo & Creed, 2002), but also in terms of
sedimented subjectivities and affective commitments.
The Shame Nexus, Power, and Social Emotions in Institutional Theory
Lastly, our analysis may hint at deeper epistemological challenges to institutional theory.
Our theorizing of the role of systemic shame in institutional processes is one attempt to address
what has been a persistent gap in institutional thinking, an inattention to disciplinary power
(Lawrence, 2008). Likewise, our analysis of the sense of shame challenges the privileging in our
depictions of institutional processes of the imagery of logics, scripts, and schema over the
imagery of social bonds, emotional commitments, and subjectification. These two contributions
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are linked because, according to Cooper and colleagues (2008:683), attention to the role of
disciplinary power requires a focus on subjectification and the social and institutional
construction of the individual. Such a focus is difficult, they argue, because it is “far removed
from the normal science value-orientation of institutional theory, which focuses upon ‘enduring
elements of social life,’ such as ‘logics’ (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006:215) rather than on the
particularity of their subjectifying effects.”
More difficult still is how attending to subjectification challenges what Cooper and
colleagues (2008) decry as the implicit assumption of an unforced and balanced reciprocity in
processes of social construction; they call for a rich incorporation of power into institutional
analysis as a corrective. Our analysis of the shame nexus suggests that if continuous selfregulation and shame avoidance animate the intersubjectivity that underlies social construction
processes, then the resulting realities must bear the mark of the shame nexus. In other words, the
intersubjective processes of reciprocal typification that are the basis of objective reality are
filtered through persons’ ubiquitous anticipation and avoidance of felt shame (as Hans Christian
Anderson’s allegory, “The Emperor’s New Clothes,” illustrates through the characters’ collective
avoidance of shame by refusing to acknowledge their emperor’s nakedness). This implies that
systemic shame and subjectification manifest in persons’ sense of shame are implicated in the
construction, institutionalization, and maintenance of cognitions, prescriptions, and practices. In
addition, through highlighting the disciplinary power of systemic shame – as well as the ways
that conformity and transgression animate institutional guardians’ exercise of episodic shaming–
we offer a view of institutionalization mediated by endogenous power relations, which need to
be understood as historically specific and asymmetric, rather than universal and consensual.
One of our goals has been to use a single emotion as a springboard for exploring the
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larger relevance of emotions to institutional theory. Based on our analysis, we believe that future
research needs to examine the ways a variety of distinct social emotions are implicated in
institutionalization by way of subjectification and the impetus to preserve valued social bonds.
Our integrating of the shame nexus helps advance our understanding of the social underpinnings
of persons’ motivation in institutional processes because it emphasizes affective bonds to other
persons and communities as an important mechanism through which commitments to
institutional arrangements emerge (Voronov & Vince, 2012).
The shame nexus also represents a rare cross-level, cross-disciplinary perspective on
emotion. By incorporating research on shame from sociology, psychology, and philosophy, we
have constructed a broad and encompassing perspective on shame, one that can account for the
person’s inner emotional life together with the social environment in which it unfolds and which
helps produce it. In other words, the shame nexus represents unique theorizing on shame, in that
it is both an articulation of a set of shame-related constructs, and an explanation of how these
constructs interact across levels of analysis. Other social emotions – those self- and otherdirected emotions that pertain to the evaluation and preservation of valued social bonds, such as
pride, empathy, guilt, embarrassment, disgust, contempt, and anger – are also likely to figure in
processes of subjectification and therefore in institutional reproduction and change. These
emotions too could be considered from a cross-level, multidisciplinary perspective that would
allow for theoretical development similar to what we present here regarding shame, rendering
them useful and usable in explanations of institutional processes.
As we have shown, using the shame nexus, examination of the role of discrete social
emotions in what we see as the twin processes of institutionalization and subjectification would
advance our understandings of the micro-foundations of institutions (Powell & Colyvas, 2008).
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We have argued that a primarily cognitive view leaves us with a flat picture of institutional
inhabitants, devoid of any sense of what is at stake for them. We have shown how one social
emotion, shame, animates self-regulation, directs attention, and triggers sensemaking, with the
possible effects of either reinforcing or disrupting institutionalized prescriptions. The logical
conclusion is that the cognitive processes underpinning institutional reproduction and change are
fraught with emotional dynamics because they unfold in the context of sedimented systems of
social relations that inform what we think, believe, value, attend to, and aspire to.
CONCLUSION
Through the exemplar of the shame nexus, our work shows how scholars can incorporate
concrete emotions into institutional theory and the value of doing so. Perhaps the most important
contribution of this work lies in our effort to dislodge the doppelgängers currently inhabiting
much of organizational institutionalism either as “disembodied minds” or “mindless bodies”
(Crites, 1971:309). Our work presents people as both cognitive and affective, as animated by
both shared understandings and passions (Friedland, 2013). Such people live life as members of
communities and thrive by preserving valued social bonds through ongoing enactments that
ratify their belongingness. The importance of these social bonds causes persons to care about
what others think and to live in the minds of others, to meet expectations and avoid breaches.
These activities are fundamental to institutional reproduction. Moreover, this intersubjectivity is
essential to constituting personhood. Membership in the systems of social relations that
concretize institutions is not equal or democratic. Instead, such communities are shaped by
power, both disciplinary and juridical; systemic shame, the sense of shame, and episodic
shaming are integral to sustaining them. Subjectification animates persons’ various emotional
commitments (Voronov & Vince, 2012) and self-regulation. In combination with multiple

51

memberships and competing social bonds, these create the conditions for how institutional
inhabitants participate in institutional processes. It is only through a deeper engagement with
these emotional, embodied, and socially embedded persons that we can begin to understand the
inhabited processes of institutional stability or change.
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